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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-2776
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CURTIS JAMES PORTER,
Appellant
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Criminal No. 2-08-cr-00380-001
(Honorable Nora Barry Fischer)
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 17, 2012
Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 27, 2012)
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Curtis James Porter appeals his sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment for a
robbery conviction. He argues that the District Court erred in classifying him as a career

criminal offender and in assessing criminal history points for offenses he committed over
twenty years ago.
I.
On September 26, 2008, Porter robbed the Friendly Federal Credit Union in
Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. Porter was arrested outside of the bank with nearly ten thousand
dollars stuffed into his sweatshirt. On September 30, 2010, Porter pled guilty to bank
robbery. Because of his extensive criminal record, the District Court found him to be a
career offender with a guideline range of 151 to 188 months under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. The District Court then granted a downward departure for his
mental and emotional condition under section 5H1.3 of the Guidelines, resulting in a
recalculated guideline range of 120 to 150 months. The court ultimately sentenced Porter
to a term of 120 months’ imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of supervised
release. Porter appeals this sentence. 1
II.
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Porter is a career offender if (1) he was at least
eighteen years old when he committed the instant offense, (2) the instant offense is a
felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) he “has
at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). While he concedes the first two requirements,
1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). While we review factual questions for clear
error, “‘[w]e exercise plenary review over questions of law, such as whether a crime is a
crime of violence.’” United States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 462 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2006)).
2

Porter contends that his criminal history does not meet the third. The District Court
found, however, that Porter had four predicate crimes of violence, including two
convictions for robbery, one for burglary, and another for resisting arrest. Porter disputes
the District Court’s findings for all but one of these convictions. 2 If any one of the three
disputed offenses qualifies as a predicate crime of violence, then the District Court was
correct to deem Porter a career offender.
Porter first requests that we reconsider our holding in United States v. Stinson, 592
F.3d 460 (3d Cir. 2010), that a conviction for resisting arrest under Pennsylvania law is a
crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining the term “crime of violence” to
include, inter alia, any offense that “is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious risk of
physical injury to another”). Under Pennsylvania’s resisting arrest statute, 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. § 5104, a defendant may be convicted of resisting arrest for either (1) creating
substantial risk of bodily harm to the officer or another, or (2) employing means
justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance. In Stinson, we
concluded that a conviction under the first prong clearly involves “conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” as required under U.S.S.G. §
4B1.2(a)(2). Id. at 464. As for the second prong, we concluded that Pennsylvania case
law had construed the provision to be limited to conduct presenting the requisite risk of
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Porter concedes that one of his 1988 robbery convictions qualifies as a predicate crime
of violence.
3

physical injury. Specifically, we determined that Pennsylvania courts had not found the
resisting arrest statute to cover passive resistance. Id. at 465-66.
Porter claims that three intervening cases—Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267
(2011), Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010), and Commonwealth v.
McDonald, 17 A.3d 1282 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011)—cast doubt on the continuing validity of
our reasoning in Stinson. We can quickly dispense with Porter’s claim that the Supreme
Court’s recent decisions in Sykes and Johnson somehow compel us to overrule Stinson. In
Sykes, the Court revisited the question of what constitutes a violent felony under a
provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924, which tracks the language
of the Sentencing Guidelines provision at issue here. But nothing in Sykes undermines
our determination that resisting arrest under Pennsylvania law constitutes a crime of
violence. Nor does Porter’s citation to Johnson for the principle that federal courts should
defer to state court interpretations of a state statute lead us to question our reasoning in
Stinson. This was precisely the principle we followed by conducting a thorough review of
Pennsylvania case law on the resisting arrest statute. See id. at 465-66. Porter’s appeal to
McDonald, a recent decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, is likewise unavailing.
The relevant passage in McDonald notes a prior Superior Court decision, in which “a
defendant’s passive resistance that required police to use substantial force to arrest her
was sufficient to sustain a conviction for resisting arrest.” Id. at 1285 (citing
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 922 A.2d 926, 927 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). But this
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statement merely paraphrases the holding of Commonwealth v. Thompson, a case we
reviewed in detail in Stinson; it does not compel us to reconsider Stinson. 3
For these reasons, the District Court properly relied on Stinson in finding Porter’s
resisting arrest conviction to be a crime of violence. Since Porter concedes that one of his
robbery convictions also qualifies as crime of violence, he has been convicted of at least
two predicate crimes of violence and is thus a career offender.
As a career offender, Porter fit within the most serious criminal history category
under the Sentencing Guidelines—Category VI. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Accordingly,
we need not reach Porter’s challenge to the District Court’s assignment of criminal
history points for a 1988 robbery conviction and a 1989 burglary conviction. 4 These
criminal history points had no impact on his criminal history category and did not affect
the District Court’s calculated guideline sentence. Because the District Court did not rely
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Porter makes much of the superficial inconsistency between our statement in Stinson
that “[t]he Pennsylvania courts have not construed the resisting arrest statute to cover
passive resistance[,]” Stinson, 592 F.3d at 466, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s
statement in McDonald that the statute reached “a defendant’s passive resistance that
required police to use substantial force. . . .” McDonald, 17 A.3d at 1285. A review of
these decisions reveals that the Stinson and McDonald decisions use the general term
“passive resistance” to refer to different types of conduct. In Stinson, we interpreted
passive resistance to involve a defendant’s “inaction or simply ‘lying down’ or ‘going
limp.’” Stinson, 592 F.3d at 466. Our determination that no decision under Pennsylvania
law has upheld a conviction for such conduct remains true. The “passive resistance” to
which the Pennsylvania Superior Court referred in McDonald involved the defendant’s
act of locking arms and legs with her husband as police struggled to pry them apart—
quite different from lying down or going limp.
4
Porter claims the government failed to present sufficient evidence to show that these
offenses fell within the applicable limitations period—i.e., that they resulted in Porter’s
incarceration at some point within fifteen years of his commission of the instant bank
robbery. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1).
5

on the disputed criminal history points in sentencing, Porter’s challenge to these points is
irrelevant to our review.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of
conviction and sentence.

6

